A minilateral solution for global climate change? On bargaining efficiency, club benefits, and international legitimacy by Falkner, Robert
  
Robert Falkner 
A minilateral solution for global climate 
change? On bargaining efficiency, club 
benefits, and international legitimacy 
 
Article (Accepted version) 
(Refereed) 
 
 
 
Original citation: 
Falkner, Robert (2016) A minilateral solution for global climate change? On bargaining efficiency, 
club benefits, and international legitimacy. Perspectives on Politics, 14 (1). pp. 87-101. ISSN 
1541-0986 
DOI: 10.1017/S1537592715003242 
 
© 2016 American Political Science Association 
 
This version available at: http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/66304/ 
Available in LSE Research Online: May 2016 
 
LSE has developed LSE Research Online so that users may access research output of the 
School. Copyright © and Moral Rights for the papers on this site are retained by the individual 
authors and/or other copyright owners. Users may download and/or print one copy of any 
article(s) in LSE Research Online to facilitate their private study or for non-commercial research. 
You may not engage in further distribution of the material or use it for any profit-making activities 
or any commercial gain. You may freely distribute the URL (http://eprints.lse.ac.uk) of the LSE 
Research Online website.  
 
This document is the author’s final accepted version of the journal article. There may be 
differences between this version and the published version.  You are advised to consult the 
publisher’s version if you wish to cite from it. 
 
 
 
	 1 
A Minilateral Solution for Global Climate Change?  On Bargaining 
Efficiency, Club Benefits, and International Legitimacy 
 
Published in: Perspectives on Politics, vol. 14, no 1, pp. 87-101 
 
Robert Falkner1 
 
Abstract: 
Gridlock in the multilateral climate negotiations has created growing scholarly 
and practical interest in the use of minilateral forums. A large variety of 
climate club proposals have been developed in recent years, which promise 
more effective bargaining among the main climate powers, better incentives to 
encourage mitigation efforts and discourage free-riding, and new ways to 
align international power asymmetries with the interests of the global climate 
regime. I investigate the three dominant rationales that underpin minilateralist 
proposals. I offer a critical review of their potential as well as their limitations 
in promoting global climate action. I argue that minilateralism is unlikely to 
overcome the structural barriers to a comprehensive and ambitious 
international climate agreement. However, climate clubs can enhance political 
dialogue in the context of multilateral negotiations and can provide a more 
conducive environment for great power bargaining. They can create club 
benefits that strengthen mitigation strategies and help reduce the dangers of 
free-riding for so-called coalitions of the willing. And they can help re-
legitimate the global climate regime against the background of profound 
power shifts that have slowed down progress in the multilateral negotiations.  
 
 
 
Despite over two decades of multilateral negotiations, international society 
has yet to produce an effective response to the threat of global warming. The 
1997 Kyoto Protocol to the 1992 UN Framework Convention on Climate 
Change (UNFCCC), so far the only legally binding treaty with specific 
emission reduction targets, has proved to be ineffective. At the 21st 
Conference of the Parties (COP21) to the UNFCCC in December 2015, 195 
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countries reached a compromise on the Paris Agreement, which will replace 
the Kyoto Protocol as the main instrument to bring global emissions under 
control. But unlike the Kyoto treaty, the new agreement relies on pledges 
made by emitters, replacing the previous top-down logic of international 
climate regulation with a bottom-up approach of nationally determined actions. 
More and more analysts now argue that UNFCCC-style multilateralism needs 
to be replaced, or at least augmented, with a new form of climate 
minilateralism. David Victor, for example, hails “the practical benefits that 
arise from crafting agreements around the core interests of a smaller number 
of countries.” 2  Moisés Naím warns against “a flawed obsession with 
multilateralism as the panacea for all the world’s ills” and advocates “a 
smarter, more targeted approach” in the form of a minilateral club.3 Anthony 
Brenton calls for a small group of “Climate Great Powers” to work together to 
explore bargaining solutions that are unavailable in the multilateral setting.4 
Likewise, William Antholis and Strobe Talbott, William Nordhaus, Anthony 
Giddens, and Robyn Eckersley propose the creation of climate clubs 
comprising a small number of key players that hold the key to finding a global 
solution.5 Timmons Roberts may be overstating the case when he describes 
the idea of climate minlateralism as “practically conventional wisdom in 
developed countries”,6 but it is hard to escape the conclusion that a discursive 
shift has occurred that has moved great power minilateralism from the 
margins to the center of the debate on international climate politics. At the 
same time, minilateralist proposals remain deeply controversial in global 
politics and provoke strong reactions, particularly in developing countries that 
fear being excluded from the negotiation process. Both the effectiveness and 
legitimacy of the international climate process are therefore at stake in this 
debate.  
 Climate change is not the only area of global concern in which 
established multilateral processes have failed to produce the required level of 
international cooperation. Political scientists warn of increasing gridlock in 
global governance across a number of international policy arenas, from 
financial regulation to nuclear non-proliferation and public health.7  In the 
environmental field, evidence is mounting that humanity is unable to provide 
adequate policy responses to resource scarcity, degradation of ecosystems, 
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and the reduction of the planet’s ability to absorb waste and pollution. The 
magnitude of the global challenge is illustrated by what scientists have 
recently coined the advent of the “Anthropocene”, a geological era in which 
human activities rival global geophysical forces in shaping the planet.8 As the 
Anthropocene unfolds and business-as-usual trends are pushing us against 
global planetary boundaries, the limitations of conventional top-down 
approaches in international governance are becoming increasingly apparent. 
And as Debra Javeline has recently argued, political scientists need to 
consider not only how to mitigate greenhouse gas emissions but also how to 
reduce humanity’s “vulnerability to the now inevitable impacts of climate 
change.”9 
In response to the apparent failure of climate multilateralism, scholars 
have proposed several forms of innovation in global governance, from bottom-
up policy processes and experimentalist governance to transnational regime 
complexes and multi-actor governance networks.10 Minilateralism is but one, 
albeit important, variant of global governance innovation. Its attraction lies not 
least in the fact that it works with the grain of international politics and merely 
seeks to modify existing processes of international cooperation. Writing in this 
journal, for example, Robert Keohane and Victor advocate building “parallel 
club-oriented regimes as part of a regime complex” rather than negotiating a 
“comprehensive, integrated regime.” 11  By creatively reshaping the 
composition of international forums to better reflect global power realities, 
minilateralism thus promises a more realistic scenario for developing global 
policy responses. 
If indeed an “effective architecture of governance system for planetary 
stewardship is likely to be polycentric and multi-level rather than centralized 
and hierarchical,” 12  as Will Steffen et al. suggest, then political science 
research needs to focus on whether and how such novel governance 
approaches can be made to work at the global level. The debate on 
polycentric governance, originally developed for local and national contexts, 
has only begun to address this question of global effectiveness.13 I aim to 
make a contribution to this debate in two ways. First, I develop a more fine-
grained understanding of how minilateralism is meant to promote global 
climate mitigation, by separating out the different theoretical rationales behind 
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club-based solutions. Second, by subjecting each of these rationales to critical 
examination, I inject a greater sense of realism into the debate and identify 
those areas in which club-based approaches can indeed make a meaningful 
contribution. Using insights from international relations theories, I map out a 
research agenda on how to turn minilateral clubs into realistic tools for global 
governance innovation without falling prey to hubristic expectations.  
The analysis unfolds in four steps. I first provide a brief review of the 
recent debate on climate minilateralism, highlighting the different models that 
have been put forward and identifying the functions they are intended to 
serve. The subsequent three sections then examine in more detail how 
convincing the rationales behind each minilateral model are:  the notion that 
small-n negotiation groups are more likely to reach an international 
compromise on climate mitigation by improving bargaining efficiency; the idea 
that climate clubs can change the underlying interest structure in international 
climate politics by creating club benefits and enforcing club rules; and the 
argument that a minilateral forum can re-legitimate the multilateral climate 
regime by empowering the great powers while establishing their special 
climate responsibilities and tying the club into the multilateral framework. The 
final section sums up my argument and proposes an agenda for future 
research. I argue that, while minilateralism is unlikely to overcome the 
structural barriers to a comprehensive and ambitious international agreement, 
it can nevertheless serve certain limited purposes:  climate clubs can enhance 
political dialogue in the context of multilateral negotiations and provide a more 
conducive environment for great power bargaining; they can create club 
benefits that strengthen mitigation strategies and reduce free-riding, but only 
for so-called coalitions of the willing; and they can help re-legitimate the global 
climate regime against the background of profound power shifts that have 
slowed down progress in the multilateral negotiations.  
 
A Review of Minilateralist Proposals 
 A growing number of analysts have advocated a minilateral solution to 
the problem of climate change. Closer analysis of these proposals reveals 
that there are in fact not one but several different minilateral models. These 
models vary in important ways, with regard to questions of club size and 
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membership, purpose and function, and legitimacy and inter-regime linkages. 
As I argue in this section, these variations reflect not just minor differences in 
regime design but contrasting theoretial rationales for climate minilateralism. 
 Most minilateralist arguments take as their starting point the 
assumption that the unequal distribution of power is an inescapable fact of 
international life, and that if lasting international cooperation is to be achieved 
then the process of negotiating international agreements must in some way 
reflect this power asymmetry. This is a central point in Miles Kahler’s classic 
definition of minilateralism as a “system of governance through great power 
collaboration”. 14  However, it is far from obvious how club size and 
membership should be determined in the case of climate change. In fact, 
existing proposals range from twenty to just two members. Naim assumes 
that the number should be “about 20,” which would account for between 75 
percent and 80 percent of global emissions.15 Others believe the right number 
is between twelve and twenty,16 with some proposing the seventeen-strong 
Major Economies Forum (MEF) as the appropriate institution.17 Todd Stern 
and Antholis advocate a much smaller setting, an “E8” similar to the G7 or G8 
meetings. 18  Brenton likewise identifies eight states as “climate great 
powers”.19 Yet others argue for even smaller clubs, ranging from seven20 to 
six21 and four22 or even just two—a G-2 composed of the United States and 
China.23  
 Why is there no straightforward answer to the question of club size? 
After all, most proposals tend to agree that climate minilateralism should be 
built around a “club of the relevant”,24 consisting of the major emitters that 
possess economic weight as well as political influence, and whose support is 
essential to an effective agreement.25 Such definitions of “relevance” usually 
revolve around a critical mass approach, which focuses on countries that 
have significant veto power and the capability to contribute to collective 
problem-solving. If we focus on a country’s share of global emissions, share 
of global GDP, and share of global population as proxy indicators for 
relevance, then China, the United States, the European Union, Russia, and 
India are in the top ten according to all three indicators. Japan, Canada, and 
Brazil make it into the top ten with regard to two indicators, while Saudi 
Arabia, South Korea, Iran, Pakistan, Nigeria, Bangladesh, Indonesia, Mexico, 
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and Australia are in the top ten according to just one indicator.26 Clearly, the 
question of “climate power” status is intimately tied to the question of how we 
define relevance in climate politics. 
 A variant of this club model, which is based on considerations of 
legitimacy in addition to those of veto power and capability, includes a mix of 
major emitters, major economies, and those countries most at risk from 
climate change—“the most capable, the most responsible and the most 
vulnerable.”27 Furthermore, if a climate club is defined not by veto power but 
by the level of ambition, then membership rules become even more fluid. 
Minilateral forums could become trend-setters in international climate policy if 
they are built around coalitions of the willing.28 By excluding laggards with 
veto power, a “transformational climate club”29 composed of environmentally-
progressive countries could create club benefits that would encourage others 
to join and gradually enlarge the circle of members as the level of ambition 
rises. Finally, some models that focus on problem-solving capacity go even 
further and propose to extend the club model beyond the inter-governmental 
realm by including non-state actors, in particular corporations that possess the 
capacity to advance global mitigation efforts in specific sectors.30 In the latter 
case, minilateralism becomes an even more flexible tool of polycentric 
governance, involving state and nonstate actors and operating at 
transnational and regional levels.31 
 It is clear from this brief review that the design of club size and 
membership is closely related to what a climate club is meant to achieve. On 
this question, three different types of minilateral functions can be 
distinguished, and it makes sense to structure our analysis around these three 
minilateralist rationales. The first is about enhancing political dialogue and 
bargaining. A minilateral forum achieves this by allowing the major emitters to 
discuss climate policy informally, away from official multilateral negotiations. 
Such a dialogue forum would enable the political leaders of the major emitters 
to build mutual trust and explore how to find common ground without the 
expectation of reaching a formal agreement, much like in the G-8 or G-20.32 
For this, club membership would be restricted to the great powers, but could 
vary depending on the specific focus of the political dialogue. Alternatively, the 
minilateral club could be the main forum for full-scale negotiations. In order to 
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lower the transaction costs of bargaining and reduce the severity of interest 
asymmetries among great powers, the number of club members would need 
to be kept to a minimum.33 Naim calls this minilateralism’s “magic number”, or 
“the smallest possible number of countries needed to have the largest 
possible impact on solving a particular problem.”34 
 A second climate club model goes beyond deliberation and bargaining 
and aims at the creation of membership-specific incentives that encourage 
compliance with climate agreements. Based on economic theories of 
cooperation,35 the minilateral forum would be structured to create specific 
benefits that can be limited to those countries that are willing to join the 
institution and abide by its rules.36 It could establish mechanisms for enforcing 
its rules and agreements, mainly by imposing sanctions on non-compliant 
members but potentially also to target non-members with a view to 
incentivizing them to join the club. Accordingly, the composition of the club 
would vary depending on the underlying interest structure and the ability of its 
members to create club benefits. Importantly, as club size affects countries’ 
willingness to pay for club benefits, the number of countries that decide to join 
the climate club would have an important influence over the bargaining 
dynamics within the club.37 
 A third model of minilateralism sees the climate club as a tool for 
legitimating great power cooperation in the context of the existing multilateral 
regime. Creating a formally-established climate club would acknowledge the 
underlying reality of great power politics and grant special rights to the great 
powers (so-called great power prerogatives) while tying them to the 
multilateral process. By creating a formal link between the club and the 
multilateral regime, this model seeks to reduce the risk of fragmentation and 
destabilization that comes with a proliferation of small-n forums. It is 
concerned with legitimating the inevitable practice of informal great power 
cooperation as a stepping stone towards more a comprehensive multilateral 
agreement, which in turn would help re-legitimate the multilateral regime in 
the eyes of the great powers themselves. In this model, membership in the 
club and institutional links to the UNFCCC would need to be designed to 
achieve small-n bargaining efficiency while retaining sufficient representation 
by less powerful members of the climate regime.38 
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 As has become clear in this brief review, we are dealing with not one 
but at least three different minilateral approaches to solving the global climate 
problem. Which of these can hope to make a meaningful contribution to the 
global mitigation challenge? I shall consider each model in turn and apply 
insights from international relations theories to identify a realistic scenario for 
climate clubs as part of global climate governance. As I shall argue, 
minilateralism offers no panacea for the ills of climate multilateralism, but a 
carefully crafted club solution holds the promise of moving us beyond the 
current state of multilateral gridlock. 
 
Bargaining Efficiency  
Rationalist theories of international relations that focus on the 
distribution of national interests and the bargaining context in which countries 
pursue their interests have been at the forefront of developing minilateralist 
proposals. Their starting point is the widely-shared observation that UNFCCC-
style multilateralism is cumbersome, inefficient, and slow. Universal 
emancipation in the negotiations empowers too many countries that have no 
interest in a workable compromise and produces outcomes that reflect the 
lowest common denominator.39 In their view, Olson’s famous dictum that “the 
larger the group, the farther it will fall short of providing an optimal amount of a 
collective good” sums up what is wrong with climate multilateralism. 40 
Creating international co-operation on emissions reductions is a costly global 
collective good, with not enough major powers willing to pay for its provision. 
Unless the major polluters’ interests change, something else—the bargaining 
process—has to change to improve the provision of the collective good. One 
conclusion that rationalists draw from this analysis is that a shift of the 
negotations towards a minilateral forum would improve the efficiency of the 
bargaining context and promote a more meaningful international agreement.  
 The “k-group” approach to international bargaining captures the logic of 
this argument.41 Small groups of countries find it easier to reach agreements 
than large-n settings, mainly because fewer countries’ interests and 
circumstances need to be taken into account, fewer bilateral and plurilateral 
side-deals need to be struck, and linkage politics can be used in a more 
targeted way. Furthermore, where club-based negotiations take place behind 
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closed doors and away from the glare of the world’s media, trust is more likely 
to be built between the club members, and the temptation for negotiators to 
pander and posture is reduced.42 This is what happened in the early phase of 
the post-1945 trade talks. The GATT (General Agreement on Tariffs and 
Trade) started out as a small club of major economies that negotiated a 
succession of trade liberalization agreements. The small number of players in 
the early GATT rounds reduced the complexity of reciprocal deals, and 
conducting the talks far from the limelight of public scrutiny helped to insulate 
the negotiations from protectionist interests.43 In short, reducing the number of 
players and creating an exclusive bargaining environment increases the 
efficiency of negotiations and boosts the chances of finding a compromise 
agreement.  
There is some evidence that the k-group logic can make a difference in 
international climate politics. Minilateralists point to the experience of the 
Copenhagen conference of 2009, where two weeks of painstaking multilateral 
negotiations failed to deliver the long-awaited global climate treaty. It was only 
at the end of the conference, when a small group of world leaders came 
together in a more informal setting, away from the strictures of the UNFCCC 
process, that progress was made. Heads of state from the most important 
emitter countries, including the United States, China, and India, were able to 
agree on the Copenhagen Accord, a short political statement that was later 
integrated into the UNFCCC agreements and paved the way for the Durban 
Platform on Enhanced Action.44 The small group that achieved this outcome 
had no formal mandate or status within the UNFCCC. Formed spontaneously 
on a self-selecting basis, it comprised the leading emitters with veto power in 
climate politics.   
But could such a k-group approach provide the breakthrough in future 
climate negotiations that the world has been waiting for? The experience with 
the Copenhagen Conference is instructive in this regard. The Copenhagen 
Accord is a political agreement short on detail and precision, laying out basic 
principles for how future negotiations are to advance the goal of climate 
mitigation. It succeeded precisely because it sidestepped some of the more 
difficult issues, especially the distribution of the mitigation burden between the 
main emitters. Where the interests of the great powers are too diverse and 
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domestic support for strong international action too weak, changes to the 
bargaining process alone cannot hope to overcome those barriers, especially 
when it comes to distributional conflicts. The comparison with trade 
negotiations—often cited by minilateralists—is also instructive here. In the 
GATT’s early days the main powers of North America and Europe achieved 
landmark deals based on a series of minilateral bargains. They were able to 
establish a rules-based regime, reduce tariffs across different sectors, and 
agree to certain national exemptions and flexibility clauses to bridge diverging 
national interests. But such compromises were possible in the GATT because 
the key countries bargained not just over the distribution of the costs of policy 
adjustment—they were also set to derive short- and medium-term gains from 
mutually agreed trade liberalization. The GATT negotiations succeeded 
because they were able to turn trade liberalisation into a (at least partially) 
private good that the members of the club could appropriate. 
In contrast, the climate negotiations are set up primarily to focus on the 
distribution of mitigation burdens, with few, if any, economic gains on the 
table, at least in the short to medium term. In a situation where the main 
interest of a significant number of great powers lies in resisting costly policy 
measures to reduce emissions, shifting the negotiations to a minilateral forum 
will do little to induce a change in the interest calculus of major emitters. As 
some minilateralists acknowledge,45 a climate club that includes most major 
emitters would face the same structural impediments to a global mitigation 
agreement that have plagued the UNFCCC negotiations. Only by excluding 
reluctant veto players and constructing the club as a coalition of the willing 
could interest divergence be reduced enough to facilitate a mitigation 
agreement. This would, however, reduce the overall impact of such an 
agreement on global emissions, thereby limiting its environmental 
effectiveness. 
This is not to say that minilateral forums cannot make a meaningful 
contribution to international climate policy. Even if they do not alter individual 
country positions in any substantial way, they can still provide a useful 
opportunity for great power dialogue that can inject political momentum into 
the multilateral negotiations. Indeed, some of the main emitters have 
repeatedly sought to engage such small-n forums to build broad coalitions 
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around their preferred climate policy initiatives. The European countries 
repeatedly put climate change on the agenda of the G-8, at the Gleneagles 
summit in 2005 and again at the Heiligendamm summit in 2007, while the 
United States preferred to work through its own minilateral institution, the 
Asia-Pacific Partnership on Clean Development and Climate (APP). To be 
sure, neither of these institutions produced any breakthrough results, and 
some were seen as potential distractions from multilateral negotiations, or 
forum-shifting, as was the case with the APP. Indeed, as I will discuss, such 
forums are still plagued by questions of procedural legitimacy, though they are 
increasingly welcomed by the leading emitters as more flexible means to 
explore opportunities for agreement in the UNFCCC and beyond. Talk may be 
cheap, but it remains an essential mode of diplomacy, especially in the field of 
climate change. 
 
Club Benefits 
The second rationale that rationalist theories of International Relations 
put forward for a minilateral approach is focused on the ability of minilateral 
forums to change interest structures. Rather than merely altering the 
bargaining process, climate clubs are expected to create incentives for states 
to join clubs and abide by their rules. By changing the way individual countries 
calculate their national interest, minilateralism is expected to become a 
transformative institution that tackles the structural barriers to strong 
mitigation agreements.    
 Analysts of international climate politics have long argued that one of 
the key shortcomings of the climate regime is the absence of international 
mechanisms that encourage compliance and deter free riding.46 For as long 
as international climate politics aims at producing a global public good in the 
form of coordinated emission reduction by all major emitters, the supply of 
such a public good will be insufficient. What is needed, therefore, is a change 
in the nature of international cooperation. Instead of aiming for near-universal 
membership in a broad mitigation agreement, climate politics needs to 
redefine climate protection as a quasi-private good. A minilateral club is 
needed to produce this shift, as it allows for the creation of club benefits that 
are restricted to those countries willing to abide by its rules. In theory, climate 
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minilateralism thus offers three advantages over a multilateral approach:  it 
allows climate leaders to go ahead with more ambitious mitigation policies 
without waiting for laggards to agree to the collective effort; it creates benefits 
from emission reductions that encourage countries to join the club, thereby 
enlarging the scope of the agreement over time; and it enables the club to 
enforce commitments as membership in the club can be suspended and 
benefits can be withdrawn. In this way, minilateralism seeks to change 
international climate politics from a lowest-common-denominator logic 
towards a more decentralized game of ratcheting up mitigation efforts.   
 Proponents of this approach draw inspiration from the experience with 
post-1945 trade liberalization talks. The GATT started out as a club of 23 
founding countries that grew into a near-universal trade organization with 161 
members (as of April 2015). Operating as a relatively small club of like-
minded advanced economies, the GATT achieved rapid reductions in trade 
tariffs in its early days, with a quick succession of five trade rounds in its first 
twenty years. Membership grew slowly but steadily during this period, and the 
coverage of trade issues expanded as well, especially with the conclusion of 
the Uruguay Round in 1994.47 The GATT integration process was driven 
initially by the United States as the world’s leading economy in the immediate 
postwar era, and later through a form of collective leadership by the United 
States, Europe, and Japan. The club nature of the GATT allowed the trade 
regime to create specific benefits to members that were unavailable to non-
members, such as market access, lower tariffs, and use of a dispute 
settlement mechanism. In this way, club-based cooperation changed states’ 
incentive structure to favour reciprocal trade liberalization, mainly because the 
GATT’s exclusion mechanism turned free trade into a private good. Even if 
the gradual expansion of free trade through GATT rounds ended up producing 
side benefits for non-members and the global economy as a whole,48 the 
discrete benefits to individual countries arising from GATT membership were 
large enough to incentivize a growing number to join the club and abide by its 
rules.49  
 How could a similar approach be applied to climate politics? The 
fundamental dilemma of international climate cooperation is that the public 
good nature of mitigation efforts creates pervasive free-riding incentives, 
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thereby undercutting countries’ willingness to contribute to the mitigation 
effort. Any country trying to reduce its own emissions faces costs that it has to 
shoulder in the short run. However, the benefits that it produces, in the form of 
global climate stabilization, materialize in the long run and are non-
excludable. In the absence of a multilateral climate regime that enforces 
national mitigation commitments, the only way to change this incentive 
structure is either to reduce the national costs of climate mitigation or to turn 
mitigation benefits from a public into a private good, or both. Minilateralism is 
meant to achieve this by creating club arrangements that pool the mitigation 
cost among a small group of countries and create excludable club benefits 
from their cooperation.  
 The benefits of club-based international cooperation are usually based 
on preferential access to certain economic gains, in the form of finance, trade, 
investment or technology. In the case of climate change, this could involve 
granting club members preferential access to climate finance, e.g., through 
grants or loans for investments in emission-reducing technologies; it could be 
based on a scheme to share proprietary low-carbon technologies at no cost or 
at below-market rates; or it could lead to collective mitigation efforts based on 
sectoral agreements or regional emission trading schemes that lower the 
costs of mitigation.50 Clubs may also need to impose sanctions on members 
to encourage compliance and deter free riding. This usually takes the form of 
exclusion from the club, withdrawal of certain membership rights, trade 
discrimination, or financial penalties. In the case of a climate club, non-
compliant members could face the withdrawal of club benefits such as access 
to climate finance and technology sharing, or the imposition of carbon tariffs 
on their exports. In principle, any such benefits could be created in a large-n 
multilateral setting, too, but where interest diversity and free-riding incentives 
are high, as in climate change, the advantages of operating in a small-n 
environment are overwhelming:  producing benefits and imposing sanctions is 
less costly, and bargaining over rules is less complex, if club membership is 
small. 
 How convincing is this minilateralist logic? In assessing the viability of 
climate clubs, it is important to consider the different ways in which they are 
expected to change countries’ incentives.  
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 The first transformation that a climate club may aim at is to make 
international action to protect the climate an excludable (private) good, so that 
membership in the club becomes valuable to major emitters. Because of the 
transboundary nature of the climate problem, climate mitigation itself can 
never be constructed as a private good. The reduction of emissions in any 
country or group of countries will always benefit the world collectively, and no 
country can be excluded from global climate stabilization. The only way to get 
around this is to focus on international cooperation that involves climate 
mitigation as a side effect but is valuable to countries for other reasons. Such 
non-climate benefits include energy efficiency gains or technological 
innovation and diffusion.51 To be sure, where such opportunities for mutually 
beneficial cooperation exist, rational actors should pursue them in any case—
adding climate mitigation into the mix merely strengthens the rationale for 
creating such clubs. Recent research suggests that climate mitigation 
increasingly offers net benefits to countries undertaking investments in low-
carbon solutions. 52  But realizing the opportunities for mutually beneficial 
arrangements will be difficult for several reasons. For one, the global 
governance of energy is highly fragmented and hindered by competing policy 
objectives. 53  Despite the recent creation of the International Renewable 
Energy Agency, 54 international cooperation on energy efficiency and green 
technology has a poor track record. The Asia-Pacific Partnership (APP), so far 
the only major experiment to create a club focused on energy efficiency and 
climate protection, offers some insights in this regard. Initiated by the Bush 
Administration as an alternative to the Kyoto Protocol, the APP was 
disbanded after only five years in operation and has had little discernible 
impact on emission trends.55 The initiative was widely perceived to be a 
laggards’ club, with key countries (USA, Australia, Canada) led by 
governments that were skeptical about the need for urgent climate action. In 
other words, the APP offered a suitable forum for action, but lacked political 
will to make a difference. A minilateral forum makes little difference if it is not 
led by ambitious countries with sufficient economic and political clout.  
Furthermore, even if a more lasting and dynamic clean energy or green 
technology club can be created, it is far from clear whether such cooperation 
would help reduce emissions as a side-benefit. The mitigation potential of low-
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carbon technologies depends on overcoming a complex web of economic, 
political, regulatory, and societal barriers, most of which are located at the 
national level. 56  International cooperation can provide a more supportive 
environment for low-carbon transformations, e.g., by pooling research funding 
or promoting technology diffusion, but the critical bottlenecks are to be found 
in the domestic realm. Energy or technology clubs that depend on positive 
externalities to reduce emissions are therefore bound to be an unrealiable and 
unpredictable instrument for climate mitigation. There are good reasons to 
pursue collective gains from cooperation on energy efficiency and green 
technology, but it is unrealistic to expect non-climate benefits from club 
cooperation to play a major role in driving global mitigation strategies. 
 The second club strategy for changing countries’ incentives is based 
on the provision of financial transfers. Paying other countries to increase 
environmental protection is a common feature in international environmental 
politics. Several multilateral regimes rely on aid mechanisms to increase 
participation and compliance, and the UNFCCC itself uses several such 
funding mechanisms to promote climate mitigation and adaptation (Global 
Environment Facility, Adaptation Fund, Clean Development Mechanism). To 
be effective, such aid mechanisms depend on a high level of environmental 
concern among donor countries and the capacity to absorb aid and reduce 
environmental degradation among recipient countries. For this reason, 
international environmental aid has usually flown from the North to the South, 
and mostly to emerging economies with large populations.57 The same has 
been the case with climate funding through the Clean Development 
Mechanism, which has benefitted primarily China, India, Brazil, South Korea, 
and Mexico.58 However, climate aid flows have had a negligible effect on 
global emissions so far and have failed to stem the rising tide of emissions 
from emerging economies. Channeling such transfers through smaller clubs 
could provide an attractive option for better targeting aid. But it is unlikely that 
environmental concern will be high enough among donor countries to pay for 
significant mitigation efforts in the largest emitters from the Global South, 
which are also major economic competitors. Financial transfers may play a 
small role in the global mitigation effort, but the leading global emitters will 
have to finance the bulk of emission reductions themselves.  
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 The third club strategy involves sanctions to reduce the risk of free 
riding. They can be imposed on existing members if they fail to comply with 
club rules or used against non-members in order to induce them to join the 
club. In both cases, the sanctions need to be costly enough to alter the target 
country’s interest calculation, which usually requires trade restrictions in one 
form or the other. Proponents of such an approach point to the use of trade 
restrictions in the Montreal Protocol, which are widely held to have ensured 
high levels of compliance and attracted near-universal participation.59 In his 
proposal for a climate club, Nordhaus discusses carbon-specific tariffs or a 
uniform tariff on imports from non-members as the best way for club members 
to ensure that others will want to join the collective mitigation effort. 60 
Economic calculations of the required tariff suggest that it would be within a 
reasonable range—Nordhaus arrives at a 2 percent universal tariff.   
However, this club logic ignores two important political barriers that 
make it an unrealistic tool for building an effective climate club. First, it is far 
from clear that non-members would choose to join a climate club when faced 
with a punitive carbon or universal tariff. Given that such a tariff would 
potentially run foul of several provisions of the WTO trade regime,61 they are 
far more likely to challenge the minilateral use of sanctions. This is precisely 
what the United States, China, and India did when the European Union 
announced its plan to include all international airlines in its regional carbon 
emissions trading scheme.62 It is interesting to note in this context that the 
Montreal Protocol’s system of trade sanctions was never challenged under 
the GATT or WTO, not least because all major economies agreed to be 
bound by the environmental regime. No such broad-based agreement exists 
among the major greenhouse gas emitters, however. Second, the obstacles 
to successfully negotiating a club agreement with strict trade sanctions are 
particularly high, and it is unlikely that any of the leading emitters, with the 
possible exception of the EU, would be willing to accede to such a demanding 
treaty backed up by punitive sanctions. Indeed, most major powers have 
traditionally resisted strong compliance and enforcement mechanisms in 
environmental treaties, preferring the flexibility that is provided by facilitative 
compliance approaches.63 Climate politics is no exception to this, where the 
majority of the leading emitters, most notably the United States and China but 
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also India, have rejected binding emissions targets that can be enforced 
through international law. The only feasible scenario for an effective sanctions 
regime would be a coalition of the willing that share a common interest in 
effective climate action and use sanctions to strengthen their commitments, or 
a regional body that can use already existing mechanisms to punish non-
compliant behavior (as is the case in the European Union).  
 Finally, a climate club would need to support any mitigation 
commitment by establishing an effective system for reporting, monitoring, and 
verification. This is to prevent shirking by members that claim to adhere to 
club rules but fail to do so in reality. This has so far eluded most existing 
minilateral efforts; most of the existing clubs, such as the Asia-Pacific 
Partnership, were unable to establish a comprehensive system of monitoring 
and verification. And the history of multilateral negotiations suggests that 
major powers are reluctant to subject themselves to strict international 
monitoring and verification obligations in the environmental field. This is not to 
suggest that this would be an unrealistic task, however. Regional clubs can 
use existing supra-national legal systems created within regions (e.g., EU 
emissions trading scheme), and the on-going UNFCCC negotiations have 
made some progress towards a global system of monitoring, reporting, and 
verification (MRV).  
 In sum, the preceding discussion suggests that while climate clubs may 
be able to make an important, if limited, contribution to global climate policy, 
they are unlikely to do so by altering the incentives of reluctant global players. 
Clubs will be at their most effective when they are constructed as coalitions of 
the willing, i.e. small groups of countries whose interests are closely aligned 
around a joint mitigation strategy. In such cases, climate clubs help the 
members to reduce the costs of emission reductions and encourage 
compliance. This can work in regional settings, for example in highly 
integrated regional organizations, such as the EU, or in looser networks of 
sub-national actors that link up their emissions trading schemes, as is the 
case in North America.64 It is also possible that such clubs emerge among 
countries and other actors whose interests are aligned along sectoral lines 
(e.g., major shipping companies and nations). In both these cases, the 
rationalist theory of club cooperation offers some limited hope for an improved 
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regime design as part of a multi-level and poly-centric governance system. 
However, climate clubs are unlikely to be able to win over, let alone coerce, 
major emitters that are reluctant to join the global mitigation effort. In this 
sense, they are not a “new solution”65 to the global climate problem. 
 
International Legitimacy  
A third rationale for climate minilateralism is centred on the notion of 
legitimacy and great power responsibility, and is based on constructivist and 
English School theories of international relations. At its core is the argument 
that minilateral clubs can remedy multilateralism’s legitimacy crisis. Viewing 
multilateralism as a distinct norm in international society that favors 
international interaction based on rules rather than the exercise of power, this 
perspective is primarily concerned with enhancing multilateralism’s 
effectiveness (output legitimacy) while preserving its procedural fairness and 
inclusiveness (input legitimacy). In the post-1945 era, multilateralism proved 
to be an overwhelmingly successful form of international cooperation that 
served the interests of great powers as well as weaker states. More recently, 
however, its input and output legitimacy have both come under strain.66 
Emerging powers are challenging the representativeness of existing 
international institutions while the established powers, chiefly the United 
States, question the usefulness of multilateral forums as the number of 
members—and veto players—expands. For multilateralism to remain both 
legitimate and effective, therefore, multilateral institutions and processes need 
to adapt to the shifting power balance and accommodate the demands of the 
powerful few. As Finnemore has argued, “the challenge for multilateralism is, 
and has always been, to devise rules that both accommodate power (so the 
strong will ‘buy in’) but are accepted by others.”67 In this view, minilateralism 
becomes a tool for re-legitimating multilateralism by giving great powers a 
privileged position in decision-making, while acknowledging their special 
responsibilities in the pursuit of the global common good.68  
 Could the introduction of minilateral cooperation restore the output 
legitimacy of climate multilateralism while retaining a sufficient degree of 
procedural legitimacy? At first sight this seems a paradoxical suggestion. After 
all, past efforts to shift the climate negotiations to other international forums 
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have widely been perceived as a threat to the UNFCCC’s standing as the 
dominant and universally accepted forum for negotiating climate policy. 
Especially US initiatives to create new minilateral institutions, such as the 
Asia-Pacific Partnership and the Major Economies Forum, were originally 
greeted with vehement opposition from within the UNFCCC’s membership.69 
Analysts have also highlighted the risks of institutional fragmentation and loss 
of legitimacy if the centrality of UNFCCC multilateralism is diluted.70  
 For constructivists and English School theorists, the legitimacy of the 
climate regime rests not solely in the broad acceptance it has gained, based 
on near-universal membership and consensus-based decision-making in a 
transparent process. It also, and critically, depends on the performance of the 
regime as a regulatory instrument. As Eckersley argues, “effectiveness is an 
important component of legitimacy,” and the climate regime’s failure to drive 
down emissions is therefore eroding its legitimacy as a workable international 
regime.71 In this view, minilateralism offers an opportunity to strengthen output 
legitimacy, by giving great powers certain prerogatives that facilitate more 
effective bargaining and strengthen compliance. At the same time, such 
climate club initiatives would need to be linked to the regime’s multilateral 
framework if a sufficient degree of input legitimacy is to be retained.  
 From its origins in the early 1990s, the UNFCCC regime favoured input 
over output legitimacy, deriving its legitimacy mainly from strong versions of 
procedural multilateralism and North-South equity. In the UNFCCC and the 
Kyoto Protocol, industrialised countries agreed to take on a larger mitigation 
burden based on the principle of “common but differentiated responsibilities” 
(CBDR), but U.S. contestation of the exclusion of large developing countries 
from emission reduction commitments undermined the greater power 
consensus around the CBDR norm. As emissions were rising fast in emerging 
economies, the question of how to readjust the distribution of the mitigation 
burden became one of the central points of contention in the post-Kyoto 
negotiations.72 In this context, the purpose of introducing minilateral elements 
is to increase the legitimacy of the climate regime in the eyes of the great 
powers. By giving them a privileged space in which to agree their respective 
contribution to the global collective mitigation effort, their special interests are 
protected in exchange for an acknowledgement of their special 
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responsibilities. At the same time, placing the minilateral forum within the 
UNFCCC regime would ensure that the overall regime structure remains 
legitimate to all countries.  
 Eckersley’s model of a climate club with formal links to the UNFCCC 
regime is the most fully developed proposal of this kind. Eckersley proposes a 
formally established Climate Council composed of major emitters and other 
countries, with members chosen from three categories:  “the most capable, 
the most responsible and the most vulnerable.”73 This Climate Council could 
be as small as eight or as large as 23 and would offer a critical mass 
approach to small-n negotiations, thus aiming for the kind of bargaining 
efficiency gains that rationalists also advocate. It would give climate powers 
an opportunity to pre-negotiate climate mitigation deals that could then be 
adopted by the wider membership of the UNFCCC, but without subjecting this 
pre-negotiation phase to the cumbersome and highly inclusive UNFCCC 
process. The great powers would be in control of the club process but would 
still need to gain the approval of the members of the Climate Council that 
represent the large majority of developing countries. Eckersley is thus explicit 
in linking any outcomes from club-based cooperation to the multilateral 
framework of the UNFCCC. In her view, whatever the Climate Council agrees 
would not replace multilateralism, but could serve “as a stepping-stone 
towards a more comprehensive treaty”.74 By formally incorporating the club 
into the existing multilateral regime and making it answerable to the 
Conference of the Parties to the UNFCCC, Eckersley hopes to ensure that the 
Council would better reflect the underlying power balance in climate politics 
while preventing an erosion of the regime’s overall legitimacy. 
 Is such a construction likely to succeed? Can it adequately reflect 
power asymmetries and grant great power prerogatives while assuring the 
weaker members of the regime that they have not been reduced to 
bystanders in the climate negotiations? In other words, can the introduction of 
minilateralism into the UNFCCC regime increase its output legitimacy, by 
strengthening the buy-in from major emitters, while ensuring a sufficient 
degree of input legitimacy, particularly with regard to the representation of 
developing countries? We need to consider three key questions in this 
context. 
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 The first question concerns the promise of greater bargaining 
efficiency. In similar fashion to rationalists, the constructivist argument for 
climate minilateralism rests on the assumption that small-n bargaining can 
lead to faster and more effective results. Eckersley, for example, supports the 
idea of a critical mass approach that enables the core group of parties on the 
Council to reach an agreement first before the remaining UNFCCC parties are 
asked to endorse it.75 However, the same problems that plague the rationalist 
case for small-n negotiations afflict constructivist arguments. Restricting 
bargaining to the major polluters cannot address the structural problem that is 
posed by interest diversity and disincentives to take costly mitigation action. If 
anything, making victims of global warming (mostly developing countries) 
members of the minilateral forum would merely reproduce the political fault-
lines that have bedeviled the UNFCCC’s multilateral process. Clearly, the 
attempt to achieve a balanced representation in the Climate Council seeks to 
address input legitimacy concerns, but by reducing the exclusivity of the club 
it makes it even less likely that such small-n negotiations could break the 
deadlock in the bargaining process. It is reasonable to expect, therefore, that 
the conflict between input and output legitimacy cannot be entirely resolved. 
 If limits on performance-based legitimacy are the price to pay for 
enhancing representativeness and input legitimacy, then a second question 
arises:  would the combined minilateral and multilateral architecture be 
legitimate in the eyes of the broader UNFCCC membership? Clearly, having a 
balanced representation of the main culprits and victims of climate change 
would ensure that developing country voices are at least heard inside the 
club. Whether they would also have veto power over any decisions taken by 
the club depends on its decision-making rules and whether its agreements 
need formal adoption by all parties to the UNFCCC. Past experience suggests 
that any deviation from consensus-based decision-making within the 
UNFCCC is highly controversial and will be resisted by developing countries. 
The informal practice of using small-n gatherings in the climate negotiations, 
from the “Friends of the Chair” groups to the high-level meeting at the end of 
the Copenhagen Conference, has attracted strong criticism at critical 
junctures in the negotiations. Formalising such minilateral practices and 
making them more representative and transparent would certainly help 
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address some of the concerns, but it is difficult to see how minilateral 
decisions could ever legitimately force the hand of the multilateral climate 
regime.76 Again, we find that the inherent conflict between output and input 
legitimacy is a dilemma that refuses to go away even if climate minilateralism 
is formally integrated into the UNFCCC.   
 The third question takes us back to the initial aim of making the climate 
regime more legitimate in the eyes of the great powers. Can the creation of 
minilateral decision-making forums provide adequate great power 
prerogatives to ensure their buy-in? It is a widely-held assumption that 
minilateralism is indeed the best way to balance power asymmetry with 
multilateral legitimacy. But the experience of post-1945 international 
cooperation shows that great power prerogatives come in many different 
forms:  from informal minilateralism (e.g., GATT’s green room) to weighted 
voting rights (e.g., IMF) and the exclusive use of veto power (e.g., UN 
Security Council). It is the analogy with international trade cooperation that 
usually informs proposals for climate minilateralism. The GATT analogy 
suggests that, if the major trading powers were able to agree multilateral trade 
disciplines informally within small-n negotiations before these were later 
adopted by the entire GATT membership, then something similar should be 
attempted in the climate negotiations. But this analogy overlooks a crucial 
difference between trade and climate cooperation. The great powers have 
used minilateral talks to structure multilateral trade deals in order to pursue 
their shared interests in advancing the trade liberalization agenda. In the 
climate talks, the main (short-term) interest that the great powers share is in 
avoiding costly short-term commitments to emissions reductions, whatever 
the long-term damage they may suffer from global warming. They may have 
come to accept a special responsibility to protect the global climate, but they 
continue to prefer to translate this responsibility into regulatory measures that 
reflect domestic policies rather than internationally agreed targets. With the 
exception of the European Union, all major emitters have come to reject the 
idea of a legally-binding mitigation agreement. Thus the main great power 
prerogative that they demand from the climate regime is the ability to set their 
own level of ambition for reducing emissions, based on domestic policy 
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preferences. This, of course, could be achieved in the existing multilateral 
process of the UNFCCC just as much as in a minilateral setting.    
 The central dilemma, then, is that climate minilateralism as an integral 
part of the multilateral UNFCCC framework would not get us closer to a strong 
and binding international agreement on mitigation, but would allow the great 
powers to shift the nature of the climate regime from a top-down towards a 
bottom-up logic of national pledges. The critical point is that major emitters 
demand flexibility, not exclusive decision-making authority, in exchange for 
great power responsibilities. Such flexibility, in the form of voluntary pledges 
to limit or reduce emissions, is already emerging in the existing multilateral 
framework, as the 2015 Paris Agreement demonstrates. Climate 
minilateralism may play a role in facilitating great power dialogue, but it is 
primarily a change in the objective of the negotiations and the nature of 
mitigation commitments that would strengthen the climate regime’s legitimacy 
in the eyes of the great powers. Minilateralism as a legitimating strategy would 
thus merely accelerate the existing shift away from a top-down regulatory 
approach towards a looser bottom-up governance system. 
 
Conclusions 
Climate minilateralism has received growing scholarly attention in 
recent years, not least because it is now widely recognized that the 
multilateral climate regime has failed to stem the rise in global greenhouse 
gas emissions. This signals a decisive shift in the debate on how to deal with 
the global threat of climate change. It parallels similar developments in other 
global policy areas marked by multilateral gridlock, from international trade to 
financial regulation and nuclear non-proliferation. While scholars debate 
whether and how the UNFCCC regime can be reformed, a growing number 
are engaged in a search for alternative approaches to global climate 
governance. The realization is setting in that policy responses to global 
warming will have to be developed simultaneously at different levels of 
governance, from the local to the regional and global, and involving different 
types and configurations of actors. Within this debate, the idea of climate 
clubs has gained particular prominence as it promises to deal with several of 
multilateralism’s main shortcomings:  its cumbersome and slow bargaining 
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process that gives veto power to too many players; its inability to create 
incentives for emission reductions and prevent free-riding; and its inability to 
acknowledge, and work with, the reality of power asymmetry that is at the 
heart of the global mitigation challenge.  Could climate clubs be a “new 
solution”77 to the global climate problem? 
 Three conclusions follow from the analysis in this paper. First, when 
discussing a minilateral solution to climate change, we need to recognize that 
there are at least three different types of minilateral logics at work—bargaining 
efficiency, club benefits, international legitimacy—and that they offer different 
paths towards a global climate solution. The size and composition of 
minilateral forums is intimately tied to the purpose that these forums are 
meant to serve and cannot be discussed independently from it. In the case of 
small-group bargaining forums, minilateralism aims at improving the efficiency 
of the bargaining situation, thereby facilitating agreement on climate mitigation 
among a small group of major emitters without necessarily altering their 
interest calculation. Climate clubs can also be designed to produce 
excludable club benefits or impose sanctions on non-compliant members or 
non-members. In this case, their purpose is to reduce interest diversity and 
create incentives for countries to join the club and abide by its rules. Finally, a 
climate club may also serve the purpose of strengthening the international 
legitimacy of the climate regime by acknowledging the desire of great powers 
for special power prerogatives while tying their club-based cooperation to the 
multilateral framework. Our assessment of whether minilateralism offers a 
potential solution must be sensitive to these three different rationales.  
 Second, closer scrutiny of these three logics offers reasons for caution 
against exaggerated hopes that surround some (though not all) climate club 
proposals. With regard to small-n bargaining forums that seek to stimulate 
dialogue and build trust among leading emitters, a change in the bargaining 
context on its own is unlikely to overcome the profound interest diversity and 
incentives for free-riding. Getting a deal on internationally-agreed mitigation 
efforts is less a question of reducing the number of players than of the 
convergence of domestic policy preferences towards strong international 
action. Concerning climate clubs that seek to shift the incentive structure 
towards stronger mitigation efforts, a focus on non-climate objectives such as 
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energy efficiency, technological innovation, or climate finance may be able to 
create certain excludable club benefits, which in turn can attract members to 
the club and reduce the tendency towards free-riding. But such changes to 
the incentive structure are unlikely to work in the case of large emitters whose 
interests are not aligned with climate mitigation or that lack domestic support 
for strong international action. Finally, establishing minilateral forums would 
go some way towards better aligning international power asymmetries with 
the objectives of the climate regime. Leading emitters could be given a 
privileged status in the climate regime’s decision-making structure in 
exchange for acceptance of their special climate responsibilities. But this kind 
of great power privilege would not achieve significantly greater buy-in from the 
more recalcitrant climate powers. Their main interest is in gaining greater 
flexibility in how mitigation policies are designed and implemented, not an 
exclusive right to set binding international targets. It is tempting to think that, 
where collective bargaining among the UNFCCC’s near-universal 
membership has failed to reach agreement on international climate action, a 
small group of global powers could cut a deal that would stand a better 
chance of being implemented. But the analysis in this paper shows that we 
need to be careful in our assumptions about what minilateralism can deliver. 
 This is not to say that minilateralism cannot play a role in future global 
climate policy. The third conclusion that follows from the above analysis 
suggests that certain uses of minilateralism offer a realistic chance of 
improving global climate governance. Minilateral forums create opportunities 
for high-level political dialogue that helps with building trust and exploring 
areas of potential compromise. If successful, they create political momentum 
that can stimulate progress in multilateral negotiations. The U.S.–Chinese 
agreement on emissions reductions, announced in November 2014 after nine 
months of bilateral talks, was widely hailed for strengthening the chances of a 
successful outcome in the 2015 Paris negotiations.78 It is but one recent 
example of how minilateral efforts, whether in the G-20 or the G-2, can inject 
dynamism into the multilateral process.  
Climate clubs can also seek to shift the incentive structure of emitters 
towards greater mitigation efforts, though this is likely to work only for those 
countries whose preferences are already more closely aligned. Such 
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coalitions of the willing can choose club structures to reinforce their 
commitment to mitigation policies, lower the costs of emission reductions, 
establish monitoring and verification systems, and prevent shirking and free-
riding. Such coalitions of like-minded actors usually emerge as regional clubs 
(as in the case of the EU) or can be constructed around specific economic 
interests based on sectoral agreements (which may also include 
corporations). In this way, minilateral clubs allow climate leaders to go ahead 
with their mitigation policies without waiting until agreement is reached among 
all major emitters. Such regional or sectoral climate clubs can also become 
building blocks of a larger climate governance architecture.79  
 Climate clubs, if established as an integral part of the multilateral 
regime, may also help re-legitimate the UNFCCC and its related instruments 
at a time when major emitters increasingly doubt its usefulness and long-term 
viability. By granting powerful states certain privileges as part of an integrated 
club arrangement, the multilateral regime would seek to balance existing 
power asymmetries with major emitters’ special responsibilities. And by 
formally linking minilateral and multilateral forums, such an approach would 
counter the risk of conflictive fragmentation of climate governance.   
The discussion here raises several questions for future research. How 
can minilateral approaches be made to work as part of an increasingly multi-
level and polycentric climate governance system? How can environmental 
leaders utilize climate clubs to raise the level of political ambition and 
encourage other actors to join in collective mitigation efforts? Future research 
will need to focus on the conditions in which minilateralism can create club 
benefits that change states’ preferences and interest calculations. This should 
involve systematically considering and comparing experiences with different 
areas of global policy coordination. It should also lead to more empirical 
investigations of how club benefits alter sectoral or issue-specific interests at 
the domestic level. Research should also be conducted on how to structure 
the relationship between emerging minilateral and existing multilateral 
regimes, so as to promote integration and synergy within an increasingly de-
centralized global governance architecture.  
In sum, minilateralism offers no panacea for the ills of climate 
multilateralism. Most critically, climate clubs cannot pressurize or induce 
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reluctant great powers to reduce their greenhouse gas emissions. However, a 
realistic approach to climate minilateralism, focused on coalitions of the 
willing, holds the promise of moving us beyond the current stalemate in 
international climate negotiations. The rise of minilateralism, often decried as 
a sign of the disintegration of the postwar multilateral order, can be harnessed 
to strengthen an increasingly polycentric field of global governance. It can 
inject political momentum into gridlocked international processes, provide new 
forms of collective leadership in a post-hegemonic world, and reconcile 
existing multilateral regimes with shifts in the global power balance. In 
situations where global public goods are in short supply, international society 
has no choice but to seek innovative approaches to global governance. 
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